Over the past year, a student rebellion has emerged in Serbia, welcomed by the public as something almost lifesaving – a sign that society is finally waking up. The catalyst was a tragedy that shook the country and raised questions about the state’s responsibility. Students left the lecture halls and took to the streets, demanding that this responsibility be discussed openly and without reservation. That moment was powerful precisely because it did not come with ready-made judgments, but with a demand for the system to explain itself. Therefore, it is crucial to critically examine the trajectory of this rebellion and its potential as a political and social response. It was a beginning with moral weight. That is why it is a significant problem that this beginning is now being aggressively transformed into a myth, and myths, as a rule, end in the trenches.
There is nothing controversial about young people protesting. What is debatable is when a protest is automatically declared the “vanguard of society” without examining its content or critically asking what is actually being demanded and what kind of Serbia this movement envisions when the cameras are off. It is even more problematic when some opposition-oriented citizens become intoxicated with the movement, as if they have found a moral substitute for politics: “They are pure,” “They are a new hope,” “They are reformists.” Then, in the next moment, this “new hope” adopts the same iconography and slogans that have previously led Serbia into a political impasse – only now with better PR.
To maintain objectivity, we must acknowledge that a significant portion of the so-called “Blockaders” is neither liberal nor reformist. Their ideological stance – on key issues of the state and society – is often more right-wing, harder, and more pro-Russian than the government they oppose. And there is an essential irony: they fight against Vučić, yet on strategic topics they often criticize him for not being “theirs” enough.
What is the test of truth?
The most straightforward way to evaluate an ideological profile is not by what a movement claims about itself, but by what it stands for when confronted with extreme situations. In Serbia, that limit is always the same: Kosovo, relations with the EU and the West, NATO, Russia, Republika Srpska, and the “national interest” as a talisman that justifies any political regression. If, when faced with this test, you hear slogans about “betrayal”, a religious-national symbolic repertoire, aggressive rejection of European values, and flirting with the extreme right, then you do not have a “progressive movement”, but a restoration.
Let us recall what “reformism” looks like in practice. Reformism means strong institutions, rules, responsibility, modernization, a rational state, European standards, and confronting reality and history. Reformism does not mean mythomania as a political program. Reformism does not mean that your most important political instrument is a flag with a map of Kosovo in Serbia or the message “no surrender” – because these are not policies; they are slogans. They may mobilize, but they do not solve anything. They create a sense of moral superiority without a plan, without consequences, and without responsibility.
This is precisely where the paradox of the student “blockade” movement lies. They began with a legitimate demand for responsibility, but ended with territorial-mythological messages, as if the fight against corruption is logically a prelude to a return to 1999 and 1995—only with younger faces.
Kosovo as a litmus test
Everything is visible in Kosovo. The government pursues a policy of balancing – often insincere, but still within the bounds of realpolitik, available options, and international pressures. The student “blockades”, however, tend toward the rhetoric of “betrayal” and make absolute demands that rule out any viable politics from the outset.
When protest demands and performances include phrases like “territorial integrity,” “defending the people,” and “responsibility of all those who violate the rights of Serbs,” accompanied by visuals reminiscent of fan and right-wing imagery, this is not a fight for justice—it is a message that their vision of Serbia is primarily an ethnostate in permanent conflict with the world. In that vision of Serbia, the EU flag is viewed with suspicion and is unwelcome, compromise is seen as treason, and any form of political rationality is considered cowardice.
Interestingly, in this narrative, Vučić is criticized for “not being tough enough.” This marks a fundamental shift: instead of democratization, there is a competition in national radicalism. This is not a change in the regime, but rather a change in the decor.
EU as enemy, Russia as consolation
Another key issue is the attitude toward the European Union and the West. Even when the “blockade” movement avoids making explicit statements, their actions speak louder: European flags are treated as provocations, removed, suppressed, and labeled “divisive.” Meanwhile, “no surrender” flags, Russian Wagner war flags, and religious symbols are accepted as “national.” The European idea is tolerated only as necessary, while extreme nationalist iconography is taken for granted and even encouraged.
This dynamic is not accidental. It results from deeply rooted anti-Western sentiment in parts of society, which has now spilled over into the “blockade” movement as if it were an empty vessel. In this sentiment, the EU is not a standard-bearer for the rule of law but an “external tutor”. The West is not a partner but an “enemy”. Russia is not considered an aggressor in Europe but as a “fraternal power” that understands us.
This leads to a clear and obvious pro-Russian orientation. One does not have to be officially “for Russia” to be pro-Russian. It is enough for Russia to serve as a moral reference, a symbol of resistance to the West, and a model of “sovereignty” that ends in autocracy. It is enough to relativize European values and equate democracy with “Western propaganda”. It is enough for your primary political identity to be defined by opposition to the West. This is a pro-Russian stance, even when presented as “neutrality”.
That “neutrality” is one of the cheapest political phrases in Serbia: it sounds wise, but in practice, it means an inability to choose a civilizational framework. Neutrality in a war of values does not exist; it is merely an excuse to remain in the comfort of authoritarianism.
NATO bombing as ideological cement
In Serbia, the NATO bombing is an emotional and traumatic subject. However, in a serious state, trauma should not be used as a political tool. When the bombing is used as identity cement to justify contempt for the West and any shift toward authoritarianism, that is not memory – it is manipulation. Part of the “blockade” movement uses this very topic to position itself on the extreme right, to prove “patriotic purity”, and to build a bridge to the ideological space long reserved for pro-Russian and ultra-nationalist narratives.
In this construction, Serbia is not a country that needs to build institutions but a victim nation where anything is permitted. This concept destroys accountability and fuels conspiracy theories. Within this framework, the fight against corruption becomes secondary: “national humiliation” is considered more important than concrete reform.
Republika Srpska and the politics of the “Serbian world”
Republika Srpska. Anyone who treats this topic lightly in Serbia today is either politically frivolous or knowingly playing with the risk of regional destabilization. When this student movement adopts symbolism and rhetoric that treats RS as an extension of Serbian statehood, rather than an entity within the complex order of BiH, it is not about concern for compatriots – it is a return to the political logic that cost Serbia dearly. Here, the right can be recognized without fail: the same myths, the same emotional blackmail, the same disdain for international frameworks, and the same willingness to address internal crises with external issues.
Lithium as a convenient channel for anti-EU sentiment
Opposition to lithium exploitation can be rational and legitimate – ecological, legal, or developmental. But in the “blockade” interpretation, it often acquires an additional layer: the EU is portrayed as a patron of colonial plunder, and the state as a traitor working for Brussels. Instead of a serious debate about standards, procedures, and oversight, an anti-European mobilization narrative emerges. Again, this is not progressive. It is progressive to demand strict standards and institutions; it is right-wing to manufacture an external enemy to avoid internal reform.
What is truly new here?
The most cynical aspect of this entire story is this: many who now idealize the “blockaders” do so because they need a moral alibi. After years of political defeats and disappointments, a movement has emerged that appears “pure”, “untainted”, and “young”. Some citizens now want to place all their hopes in it – without question, without doubt, without criticism. This is not political maturity; it is escapism and cowardice. Politics without criticism leads to worship. And worship is always sectarian: “Ours are good; theirs are evil,” and “Do not touch them; they are sacred.” In such an atmosphere, any comment about their nationalist, extreme, or pro-Russian tendencies is labeled an “attack on students”. No. Attacking students is pushing them into a myth rather than treating them as political actors who must answer questions— questions they avoid. But avoiding an answer is already an answer. When a movement avoids taking a stance, it is not “protecting itself from division” – it is preparing to adopt the loudest, most aggressive narrative. In Serbia, that narrative has been right-wing and pro-Russian for decades and has never benefited the country.
I recognize the energy of young people, and I acknowledge the legitimacy of the initial rebellion. But I will not participate in the collective hypnosis that assumes every student body is automatically progressive. It is not. A mass is just a mass; ideology and values guide it.
If the goal is for Serbia to become a decent country, then we do not need new young messengers of old myths. We do not need “blockades” that end in Kosovo, in iconography, in the flags of the Russian criminal Wagner group, in contempt for Europe, and in a romanticized image of Russia. That is not the path to reform. It is a regression – just with younger faces and better staging.
The worst outcome would be if, out of desperation over Vučić, we accept an ideological package that is just as bad: anti-Western, nationalist, pro-Russian, and emotionally manipulative. In that case, we would not have gained an alternative government. Instead, we would have ended up with a more radical version of the same ideology.
And Serbia has no more room for “more radical versions”. Serbia only has room for a serious state. In the end, that is the only real division.