Even if the experiment with the reconstruction of the Government of Montenegro were carried out in conditions without substance and external influence, in a vacuum, for example, there is little chance that it would succeed. If the names of potential ministers, the names of the parties, their complicated relations were removed from the reconstruction plan on the table, if this plan were a pure laboratory sample, it would probably not give any sign of life and activity even then.
Since politics is not a laboratory and cannot exist in a vacuum, the chances that the reconstructed Montenegrin Government will bring some results are zero. Even for its members. The government of Zdravko Krivokapić is not cursed, the evil forces have nothing to do with its difficult destiny and, probably, short life. When, and not if, one day it ceases to exist, and that will certainly be before its four-year term, the government’s failure will be sufficiently explained by rational reasons, those that are exclusively in the sphere of politics.
In exactly one week, Zdravko Krivokapić’s cabinet will be ten months old. It didn’t cover even a quarter of its mandate, and if it had a face, it would look like a tortured old woman, with few life impulses. It is possible that it looked like that on the day it was born, on December 4 last year. No day since has it been stable, functional or efficient, nor will it be if it is reconstructed, as announced. There are several things that determined it difficult destiny even before it was born.
First of all, the extremely narrow majority that supports it, 41 deputies in relation to 40 opposition ones. That constant threat of at least one MP going to the opposite camp has been hanging over the head of the new Montenegrin ruling majority since the election night on August 30, when it was celebrated. Their expectations that in time Đukanović’s DPS will fall apart and that this may make the parliamentary difference bigger, in favor of the new government, did not come true either. Chaos and divisions in Đukanović’s camp were desired, and the media celebrating the new winners wrote big headlines that Duško Marković, the former prime minister, and then Milica Pejanović Đurišić would leave and form a new party. None of that happened, it was just sedatives to calm one’s own fears. But even with a narrow majority, one can live for four years, that does not have to be a reason for the government to be unstable. For example, the last government of Boris Tadić (Mirko Cvetković) pushed through the entire mandate with a much “closer” majority of 126 deputies.
The government of Zdravko Krivokapić, apart from this, has some much bigger handicaps. It was made on a foundation in which no one wanted to put a pillar. That foundation was an agreement drawn up on September 9 last year, signed by Krivokapić, Aleksa Bečić and Dritan Abazović. They did sign it, but did they write it? This paper, then and now, acts as a sedative for the fears of the West that the new Montenegrin government will not give up and leave NATO, lift sanctions against Russia and withdraw the recognition of Kosovo. The calming effect of this agreement will fade with the reconstruction of the government, and its provision that the new Montenegrin government will be “expert” will completely disappear.
Its “expert” form did not bring not even one desired result, and that is the amortization of the huge program, ideological and interest diversity in the ranks of the ruling bloc. On the other hand, it brought all the expected and even some unexpected problems, which will decide its final outcome. The “expert” form was just a facade for the great politicization of Krivokapić’s government, which in itself should not be a problem. Provided that the politicization is carried out with the consent and participation of the majority shareholder in the Government, the Democratic Front, which, however, was completely excluded from that job and because of which it feels cheated.
And in the end, even if we ignore everything previously mentioned, Krivokapić’s government could not have been any different because it did not have any common, positive vector within it that would keep it under pressure and together. The one it has is negative and answers the question – What don’t you want? The return of the DPS to power, of course. But for the success of the government and its policy, it is not enough to know “what is not wanted”, one must know “what is wanted”, and there is no single answer to that question in the ruling Montenegrin bloc, there are many answers, as many as parties, leaders, their deputies, MPs, candidates for ministerial posts. Plus, the prime minister.
That is why the restructured Government will not bring about change. Not only because it has the same starting parameters as the previous one (narrow majority, numerous and diverse coalition, diametrically different interests and views of the world), but all of them together will only accelerate the natural flow for solving such problems, which are early elections. The reconstructed government will be, both in form and in essence, the complete opposite of the previous one. An “expert” is made into a full-blooded political government. The majority Democratic Front is, of course, looking for a majority package in the new organization, while the prime minister is cashing in on his constitutional token and asking to remain in that position. This was possible from the first day and it is possible that it would work. However, it is too late for such a reconstruction now, in the past year (since the elections) or ten months (since the election of the Government) Montenegro has changed to such an extent that even such heavy make-up cannot pull the country out of the crisis, because it is only make-up. And the crisis is real and unquestionable.
Neither before nor after the reconstruction, the Montenegrin ruling bloc and its governments will be able to fix their core problem. So far, neither after the reconstruction, none of them sincerely believes in their own endeavor. If they were a company, none of them as owners would invest a single cent in their company. And with the passage of time, the trust of small shareholders is falling apart, so that the fear of the collapse of the company legally presses everyone in the coalition to do the only thing they can, to buy time and postpone the inevitable elections. That is the only motive for the upcoming reconstruction of the Government, but it also hides the embryo of its imminent end. In the face of the inevitable and the desire to raise their positions with the voters by “soloing”, each of the three government factors will, in fact, sell the time they want to buy with the reconstruction. The first day of the reconstructed government will therefore not be the beginning of its recovery, but the beginning of its final phase.